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This paper investigates the direct linkage between institutional quality and illicit financial flows (IFFs). 
Despite the methodological concerns regarding measures of IFFs, the international development 
community and researchers agree that a large amount of capital illegally flowing out of developing and 
developed countries has become a major developmental issue. This paper uses the IFFs dataset from 
research organization Global Financial Integrity (GFI), consisting of 47 developing and developed 
countries from the period of 2005 to 2014. Corruption and political stability are found to be correlated to 
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This paper investigates the linkage between institutional quality and illicit financial flows (IFFs)1, holding 
other macroeconomic causes of flows constant. It infers poor institutional quality not only as an 
investment risk but also as a primary enabler of criminal activities that generate the illicit flows. 
Therefore, the testable model deviates slightly from the investment risk function presented in Le and 
Rishi (2006) and explicitly includes parameters of institutional quality to capture the effectiveness of 
domestic governance. The novelty of this paper is that it tries to find the direct linkage of institutional 
quality and IFFs using an econometric model of economic risk and governance indicators.  
Background 
Every year, billions of dollars are channeled out of developing countries illegally. Such illicit flows drain 
much-needed resources for domestic expenditure and investment, for both the private and public sectors. 
The impact is even more substantial for the least developed countries (LDCs) and low-income countries, 
given their smaller resource bases. In addition, these flows are corrosive to state institutions since they are 
criminal in nature (e.g., tax evasion, money laundering) and often aided by corrupt public officials 
(OECD, 2013). Corruption diverts resources from public to private consumption and weakens trust of 
citizens in public officials and institutions. On the other hand, activities such as money laundering 
undermine the integrity of the financial sector, whose functioning depends highly on the integrity of the 
system.  
This phenomenon of illegal cross-border movement of funds is not new. However, “The order of 
magnitude of these estimates, much more so than their exactitude, warrants serious attention in both the 
developing countries and in the wealthier world,” (Spenjers and Salomon, 2017). 
The concept of illicit financial flows, however, is quite controversial. It is “marred by a lack of 
terminological clarity, which somewhat limits the emergence of effective policy options” (UNECA, 
2013). Multiple definitions lead to multiple measures of illicit flows. However, despite the conceptual and 
                                                          
1 This paper will use illicit financial flows, illicit capital flight and illicit capital flows interchangeably. 
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methodological concerns, the consensus among development experts and institutions is that the IFFs 
surpass the sum of official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (OECD, 
2013). According to estimates produced by research institute Global Financial Integrity (GFI), in 2014 the 
IFFs (outflows and inflows combined) from developing and emerging economies were believed to be 
between 2 trillion United States dollars (USD) and 3.5 trillion USD, likely to account for between about 
14.1 percent and 24.0 percent of total developing country trade. Between 2005 and 2014, on average, the 
illicit financial outflows are estimated to have grown at a rate between 7.2 and 8.1 percent (620 billion 
USD to 970 billion USD in 2014) annually, and the illicit financial inflows are estimated to have grown at 
a rate of about 9.2 to 11.4 percent (1.4 trillion USD to 2.5 trillion USD in 2014). 
The scale of these flows raises alarm. Even though the issue itself is not new and it is not abating (Boyce 
and Ndikumana, 2001), it has not moved to the forefront of the international development agenda until 
recently. Governments worldwide now acknowledge the severity of IFFs’ impact and size, and are joining 
forces in combating all aspects of them. In 2015, member countries of the United Nations agreed to 
“substantially reduce IFFs” in their Sustainable Development Goals Framework as part of the 2030 
Development Agenda.  
This paper will be based on the IFFs definition developed by GFI which is currently in use across various 
international organizations. The fundamental operating premise behind this definition is that the transfers 
in question take place via unregistered channels because their background or purpose is illegal. A brief 
review of estimation methodologies is presented in the literature review section.  
Empirical studies of illicit flows are rare. Most researchers consider illicit flows under the umbrella of a 
broader capital flight concept, which has been investigated substantially in literature. Recent studies on 
measures of illicit flows focus on decoupling the methods that measure the illicit component from overall 
capital flight measures. However, these methodologies are still evolving and resulting datasets vary, both 
in terms of size and availability. The attempts to quantify the causal impacts of illicit flows may be 
premature. Therefore, this paper will instead focus on the correlations of illicit flows.  
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Literature Review 
As described above, most researchers have subsumed the IFFs under the concept of capital flight and 
explore primarily the causes of that phenomenon. Therefore, it is only appropriate to begin with an 
overview of how the concepts and measures of capital flight have developed over the years and how the 
IFFs are decoupled from capital flight conceptually and methodologically. This literature review is 
organized into four parts. It will start with an overview of different definitions of capital flight (and illicit 
capital flows). It then presents the review of different measures of capital flight, as well the measures used 
by the GFI to estimate the IFFs. It ends with a discussion on recent studies which investigate the 
determinants of capital flight and the association of capital flight on macro and non-macroeconomic 
variables. 
Definitions of capital flight 
There exists no conventional definition of capital flight; this is because it is conceptually difficult to make 
a distinction between ‘normal’ capital outflow and ‘abnormal’ capital flow, which is referred to as capital 
flight. To distinguish capital flight from ‘normal’ capital flow, researchers employ different criteria in 
their definitions. Dooley (1986) emphasizes the motivation behind the flows and sees capital flight as all 
resident capital outflows, aiming to move beyond the reach of domestic authorities. This criterion is like 
the one employed by Deppler and Williamson (1987), in which the definition of capital flight is 
“acquisition or retention of a claim on non-residents that is motivated by the owner’s concern that the 
value of his asset would be subject to discrete losses or impairment if his claims continued to be held 
domestically.”  For some researchers, capital flight is a reaction to a potential investment calamity. For 
Cuddington (1986), capital flight is short-term private capital outflow, which occurs in the response “not 
only to political crisis but also to economic policy failure.” This approach has been adopted in a more 
simplified fashion in recent literature. For example, Schneider (2003) sees capital flight as the outflow of 
resident capital from a country in response to economic and political risk in the domestic economy. 
Another important, yet subtle, reason behind different definitions may be attributed to the way researchers 
understand capital flight. Capital flight includes both licit and illicit outflows. While capital flight, in 
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general, can be considered illicit because of the concealed and hidden nature of the transfer, some 
movement of funds across the border can be considered legal2. Also, it becomes rather ambiguous when 
honestly-acquired capital is moved across the border illegally beyond the reach of domestic corrupt 
officials or illegally-acquired capital is laundered out of the country to avoid detection or taxation. 
Ndikumara et. al (2014) argues that some capital flight is illicit if it involves “funds acquired illegally,” 
“funds transferred abroad illegally,” and “funds held abroad illegally.” This formulation compares to the 
definition put forward by the GFI research institution, who defines IFFs as “cross-border transfers of 
funds that are illegally earned, transferred and utilized” (Kar and Spanjers, 2014; Spanjers and Salomon, 
2017).  
For clarity, this paper uses the capital flight definition proposed by Schneider (2003) and the IFFs 
definition proposed by the GFI. These definitions carry the following aspects:  
1. capital flight encompasses all types of capital outflow from a country, regardless of their legality, 
including the illicit flows.  
2. risk-aversion/profit-maximizing motive behind the capital flight falls under the scope of the 
portfolio choice model of asset allocation, and    
3. even though generating activities of the IFFs are criminal in nature, the motive behind the cross-
border movement of them is assumed to be risk-averse or profit-seeking. 
Measures of capital flight 
There are several methods attempting to estimate the magnitude of both licit and illicit capital flight. 
Hot Money Measure 
The Hot Money measure, developed by Cuddington (1986), focuses on the short-term capital outflows 
that correspond to political or financial crisis, heavier taxes or potential tightening of capital controls. The 
                                                          
2 For example, funds declared to host-country authorities sometimes do get recorded in the BOP data, due to 
bureaucratic error. 
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common practice of measuring hot money is to treat the errors and omissions entry in the balance of 
payments as a measure of private capital flows. To the extent that net errors and omissions line item 
captures the flows of money, not the statistical errors, it must include only illicit flows.  
World Bank Residual Method (WBR) 
A second approach, which has been widely used by researchers and was developed by the World Bank 
(1985), is denoted as the World Bank Residual Method. It measures capital flight as the difference 
between sources of capital inflow (i.e., net increases in external debt and the net inflow of foreign direct 
investment) and uses of capital flows (i.e., the current account surplus/deficit and changes to foreign 
reserves).  
There are several modifications proposed to original simple residual measures. Boyce and Ndikumana 
(2001) propose a modification to account for the long-term debt stock variations due to the exchange rate 
fluctuations by using currency composition. Ndikumana et al. (2014) propose an adjustment to account 
for debt write-offs, “given that they are reported as a reduction in the stock of debt, even though they have 
no corresponding outflow of debt repayment.”  
Dooley Model 
Another important approach, developed by Dooley (1986), is known as a Dooley method, which sees 
capital flight as capital outflows aiming to move beyond the reach of domestic authorities. Therefore, the 
focus is on privately held foreign assets that do not generate income reported to domestic authorities; it is 
measured as the part of an increase in external holdings by citizens that yields investment income, which 
does not get reported. The main advantage of this method is its ability to differentiate between licit and 
illicit capital flight as those assets, which do not generate reported income, are believed to be the ones 
which try to avoid the existing controls and, thus, constitute an illicit capital outflow.  
Trade Mispricing Model 
The Trade Mispricing model measures capital flight by observing the amount of systematic faking of 
trade invoices, also known as trade misinvoicing. The BOP data and current account data used in the 
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Residual method can be distorted because of trade misinvoicing. The measurement assumes that domestic 
traders falsify the amount of imports/exports to keep capital abroad (Schneider, 2003). It is estimated by 
comparing a country’s import and export data to that of its trading partner by using Direction of Trade 
Statistics Yearbook (IMF). However, as noted by Ndikumana et al. (2014), this measure does not capture 
the “related but distinct phenomenon of transfer pricing” in which same amounts are reported in both 
exporting and importing countries, despite using anomalous prices.  
Measure of Illicit Financial Flows by the Global Financial Integrity 
GFI estimates IFFs by including these components:  
1. an estimate of trade misinvoicing, and 
2. an estimate of funds that leave the domestic economy through private capital flows. 
GFI uses the Trade Mispricing model to estimate the first type of flows. Traditionally, GFI has estimated 
the second type of flows using the World Bank Residual (WBR) method; however, as Kar and Spanjers 
(2014) notes, this is not necessarily an illicit outflow. This model does, to some extent, capture licit funds 
as well. To correct for this fact, GFI uses the Hot Money measure instead. As stated earlier, the net errors 
and omissions line item captures the flows of money, not the statistical errors, therefore it must include 
only illicit flows. As such, compared to estimates from WBR method, estimates produced by Hot Money 
measure are more conservative and representative of the ‘illicit’ part of capital flight. 
Review of studies of determinants and associations of capital flight 
The literature on capital flight concentrates primarily on two streams: study of determinants of capital 
flights and study of associations with macro and/or non-macroeconomic variables.  
The determinant literature focuses on two approaches to explain the determinants of capital flight: 
investment climate approach and discriminatory treatment approach. The first approach examines the 
issue of capital flight as a portfolio diversification choice made by individuals, while the second approach 
focuses on the differences in guarantees given by the authorities to domestic and foreign investments. 
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Cuddington (1986) employs the first approach to show that overvaluation of exchange rates, high foreign 
lending and high domestic inflation cause capital flight. Dooley (1986), employing the second approach, 
shows that capital flight is generated by domestic investors who are facing discriminatory treatment from 
authorities. Hermes and Lensink (2001) find that development aid, in the form of loans and grants, has 
positive effect on capital flight. Collier et al. (2001) finds that there are large regional variations in the 
proportion of portfolio held abroad. These regional differences are driven by the variables that indicate 
domestic investment climate, such as exchange rate over-valuation, adverse risk ratings and high 
indebtedness. Hermes and Lensink, 2001; Le and Zak, 2006) find that political risk has effects on capital 
flight, despite how the capital flight is defined or measured. Analyzing on African countries, Ndikumana 
and Boyce, 2003; Ndikumana et al., 2015 find that external borrowing is a consistent determinant of 
capital flight. Their results show that, for every USD of external borrowing by a sub-Saharan country in 
any given year, approximately 80 cents – on average – leaves the country as capital flight.  
The other stream of studies on capital flight focus on the association of capital flight and macro- and non-
macro variables. Using the WBR capital flight data of 45 non-Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries, Collier et al. (2004) shows that foreign aid reduces the capital flight. 
Considering corruption as a factor in raising investment risk, Le and Rishi (2006)3 performed panel 
analysis on a large sample of developing countries and found that corruption impels capital flight by 
raising the domestic investment risk, while controlling for return differential, GDP and standard economic 
risk parameters. In a large sample study by Le and Zak (2006), political risk factors are found to have a 
significant positive relationship with capital flight, known as ceteris paribus. Cerra et al. (2008), using a 
large panel dataset of over 100 countries, show there exists a revolving door relationship between 
borrowing and capital flight. Cobham et al. (2017) find that untaxed capital from illicit flows can be  
significant to level of national income inequality at varying degrees across different countries. 
                                                          
3 Based on the portfolio choice model of asset allocation that explicitly recognizes corruption as contributing to the 
variance of domestic investment risk. Le & Rishi (2006) employed the WBR method to estimate capital flight. 
14 
One common factor4 among all the above-mentioned studies is the use of capital flight data estimated by 
employing the WBR method. Relatively few empirical studies have examined the effects of (illicit) 
capital flight using data generated by Hot Money measure and/or the Trade Mispricing model. In recent 
study on a group of Eastern European countries, Andriani and Zajaczkowska (2017) find that illicit 
financial flows reduce with the institutional quality and increases with tax levels. Even though there exists 
a significant amount of recent literature on the IFFs by the international development organizations 
through their advocacy works, the scientific studies on determinants and associations of IFFs are 
relatively rare. 
This paper works to fill in this research gap by using the GFI measure of IFFs. The GFI measure aims to 
capture the illicit share of capital flight using the Trade Mispricing model and Hot Money measure. Given 
that the measures of estimating illicit flows are still evolving, it is only reasonable for this paper to 
explore the associations of illicit flows, instead of quantifying the determinants of the IFFs. 
Ndikumana (2013) states that the enormous capital outflows from the African continent can hardly be 
explained any longer by insufficient investment opportunities in the countries of origin or as a reaction to 
political risks. Moreover, the assumptions of portfolio diversification alone may not be enough in 
explaining the IFFs originating in economically successful industrialized countries and fast-growing 
emerging countries, flows that mainly serve the purpose of tax evasion. Also, these (illicit) capital flows 
are oftentimes assisted by corrupt governments with a preference for foreign asset accumulation (Boyce 
and Ndikumana, 2011), thus generating them involves criminal activities such as corruption, money 
laundering and tax evasion (OECD, 2013).  
The primary focus of this paper is finding institutional quality-IFFs linkage. It infers that poor 
institutional qualities impel the IFFs by enabling an environment that generates illicit transfers, as well as 
raising the risk of domestic investment. Therefore, the testable proposition can be stated as follows: Do 
                                                          
4 Except Kent (1986) who uses Hot Money Measure to estimate the capital flight data, while Cobham et al., (2017) 
estimated illicit flows using the WBR and HMM methods. 
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poor institutional qualities impel the IFFs, ceteris paribus? This paper tests this proposition across a 
balanced panel of 47 countries over a 10 year period, from 2005 to 2014.  
The Econometric Model 
This section explores the linkage between IFFs and corruption in greater detail by modeling the 
relationship in the portfolio choice model based on Le and Rishi (2006) and Le and Zak (2006). 
Consider an economy with many indefinitely-lived identical agents living in a low- or medium-income 
country. Agents consume from the return on wealth allocated to one-period investment in the domestic 
country or to a (single) foreign country. For simplicity, there is one investment in each country (which 
could be considered a portfolio of investments). Labor is excluded from the analysis. There is a single 
homogenous good produced in both countries. The population is constant, immobile and normalized to 
unity. 
Let 𝑎𝑡 denote investment in the domestic market at time t, that earns a rate of return 𝑟𝑡. Investments in the 
domestic market are assumed to be risky because of poor governance, r ~ N(µ,θ2). The domestic risk-free 
return is unavailable. Agents also invest 𝑎𝑡
𝑓
 in a foreign country, earning a risk-free time-invariant rate of 
return 𝑟
𝑓
 which can be considered as United States government bonds. 
A representative agent maximizes lifetime utility by solving 




         (1) 
subject to 




− 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑎𝑡+1
𝑓
       (2) 
where U(c) is strictly increasing, continuous and concave. 
Solving the necessary and sufficient conditions to optimize the utility maximization problem (1) yields5: 
𝑎𝑡+1




       (3) 
                                                          
5 See Le, Q.V. & Zak, P.J. (2006) “Political risk and capital flight” for detailed derivation of equation (3). 
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where 𝑉𝐴𝑅 (𝑟𝑡+1) is variance of the return on domestic investment, and 𝜃 = (𝐸[𝑈"(𝑐𝑡+1)]/𝐸[𝑈′(𝑐𝑡+1)] 
measures risk-aversion, which is assumed to be a constant. 
Assuming individuals in the other countries are also solving the analogous problem, let us denote that the 






       (4) 
Where 𝑎𝑡
𝑓𝑜𝑟
 represents capital invested by foreigners in the domestic market, 𝐹𝑡
𝑓
 stands for total capital 








, denoting the licit capital flight and 
𝑎𝑡
𝑓(𝑖)








Eq. (4) shows that, in equilibrium, the capital stock is formed from domestic investment and net foreign 
investment. 

















































]      (7) 
where µ𝑙 +  µ𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 +  𝛽 = 1.  
As in Le and Rishi (2006), using a linear production to transform the capital into output, 𝑌𝑡 =  𝜆𝐾𝑡, for 
𝜆 > 0, Eq. (7) can be written in terms of relative to output:  
𝑎𝑡
𝑓(𝑖)









]          .  













]      (8) 
Eq. (8) shows that illicit capital flight is higher when the domestic return is low, the risk of investment is 
high, the risk aversion is high, the foreign investment is low and “𝛽” parameter is small. The influence of 
discount parameter “𝛽” in this illicit capital flight equation can be attributed to factors that enable the 
activities impelling the illicit capital flight. As mentioned in the previous section, the activities that 
generate illicit flows are not only driven by the risk-aversion motives, but also by the concealed purposes 
that are criminal in nature. For example, an individual may be transferring capital out of a domestic 
market because s/he is trying to gain better returns in a foreign market, to avoid taxation and/or to launder 
illegally-earned money. Therefore, discount parameter “𝛽” indicates the existence and level of 
environment that enables such activities to occur6. The indicators that best represent the value of “𝛽” may 
be the indicators that report the quality of institutions. Given the multi-dimensional nature of the 
institutional quality, several variables will be used to capture its various aspects. In this paper, “𝛽” will be 
expressed as a function of following variables: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption. 
𝛽 = h (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
corruption)                  (9) 
As in Le and Rishi (2006), the variance of the return is originated from three types of economic risk: 
inflation risk, interest rate risk and exchange risk. Assuming each type of risk is independently 
distributed,  
𝑉𝐴𝑅 (𝑟𝑡) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)        (10)  
                                                          
6 Given the existence of such environment, individuals may discount the future of funds in domestic markets more 
and move them abroad more.  
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Testable empirical model and proposition 
Taking natural log on both sides of eq. (8) yields:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑡
𝑓(𝑖)









])}        (11) 
and let 𝐴 =  𝑎𝑡
𝑓(𝑖)
; B = 
𝑌𝑡µ𝑙
𝜆
; 𝐶 = 𝛽[𝑎𝑡
𝑓𝑜𝑟





Eq. (11) can then be simplified as: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴)  =  𝑙𝑜𝑔 {(𝐵 −  𝐶) + 𝐷}, 
Where the right-hand side of the above equation can be approximated by applying Taylor expansion7 







































+ ⋯       (12) 
  
Based on eq. (12) the main testable model can be described as follows: 
log (𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑠) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛼2(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) +
 𝛼3(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼4(𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛼5(𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤) +
𝛼6(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)  + 𝛼7(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟
𝑓) +    𝛼8(𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)) +  𝛼9(𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)) +
𝛼10(𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)) + 𝛼11(𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃) + 𝛼12(log (𝐺𝐷𝑃)) +  𝜙           (13) 
It is important to note, however, that even though eq. (12) describes to have the term 
𝐷
𝐵−𝐶





] divided by the difference of GDP and FDI, this paper will include parameter “𝛽,” which is 
a linear combination of variables of institutional quality, separately and individually. This will enable the 
results of institutional quality parameters examined separately. Moreover, both terms for IFFs and GDP 
are in logarithmic form. 
The main testable proposition of this paper is that poor institutional quality can impel the IFFs, given the 
return differential, GDP, FDI share of GDP, inflation risk, exchange rate risk and interest risk. 
Data 
Dependent variable - IFFs 
                                                          
7 Log(a+b) = log(a*(1+b/a)) = log a + log (1+b/a). The second term on the righthand side of the equation can be 
approximated by using Taylor series expansion, log (1+b/a) = b/a – b2/2a2+b3/3a3+… 
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A balanced panel data of 47 countries over the period of 2005 to 20148 are considered in this study. Only 
countries with complete time series data for IFFs for the above-mentioned period are selected. This is (1) 
because of the issue of missing/zero values in original GFI dataset9 and (2) to avoid the imputation of 
missing values10. Countries included in this dataset (47 countries) have, on average, higher flow of IFFs 
and stock GDP-PPP, compared to those not included in this study (65 countries). Moreover, they carry 
higher CPI and overall better institutional quality values than the excluded group. Summary of Student’s 
t-tests performed are presented in Table A.2 of Annex A. Table A.3-7 present the results of t-tests using 
mean of all years, mean of 2005-2009, mean of 2010-2014, initial (earliest) year and latest year of each 
country. The countries included in this study are presented in the Table A.8 of Annex A. Regions 
represented are Africa (13), Asia (12), Europe (7) and Latin America and Caribbean (15). It is important 
to note that since only complete countries are included, results may suffer from loss of precision and have 
smaller population coverage. However, the author views that, given the complexity and still evolving 
nature of current estimation procedures, it is best to refrain from imputing the missing values to avoid 
misleading conclusions. 
The dependent variable is the IFFs transformed into logarithmic form, estimated by the GFI research 
organization. As mentioned in the previous section, the concept and methodologies of IFFs measures are 
still in debate. However, the definition and measures11 of IFFs employed by GFI are widely used in 
research and across international organizations.  
Independent variables 
                                                          
8 Data are available from Global Financial Integrity’s webpage (http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/illicit-financial-
flows-to-and-from-developing-countries-2005-2014/). 47 countries with complete time series data for all variables 
for 2005-2014 are selected out of a maximum set of 112 countries with some data for all variables. 
9 GFI's dataset contains a number of zero values for many countries. Though zero value represents "no reported IFF 
flow", it does not mean that such flow does not occur.  
10 Any imputation procedure for missing IFF values needs to take the country-specific political and economic 
situations into consideration. It also requires a review of country-level BOP, trade, and other official records. 
11 An overview of the definition and measure of the IFFs by the GFI is presented in the literature review section. 
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The main variable of interest among the parameters of institutional quality is corruption. This paper uses 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), developed by Transparency International, as a measure of 
corruption. Corruption is one of the most severe challenges for the economic and social development of 
developing and developed countries alike. Fighting corruption requires the ability to understand and 
measure it accurately. However, measuring corruption has, to date, proved to be elusive and difficult, as 
corruption is closely linked to quality of institutions and governance (Bjørnskov, 2011) and could well lie 
hidden beneath other economic and social shortfalls within a country. For example, a measure of 
corruption in the form of court bribery cases may be of little to no use for cross-country analysis since the 
measurement may simply reflect the quality of institution in a respective country or territory, in this case, 
judiciary institutions as opposed to corruption itself. Therefore, as Le and Rishi (2006) explained, 
researchers prefer to use perception based corruption measures based on surveys. The CPI is built by 
aggregating the opinions of a group of experts and business people and measures the perceived levels of 
public sector corruption in each country. The scores published before 2012 are normalized to make them 
comparable in size to the figures published after 2012.  
A set of other variables of interest measures various aspects of institutions – namely Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Corruption and Rule of Law. Countries differ in quality of institutions, which could 
contribute toward shaping the overall investment climate of domestic economy. Le and Zak (2006) found 
that political instability accelerates the capital flight, while Hermes and Lensink (2001) found that policy 
uncertainty is statistically related to the capital flight when a set of economic control variables and 
political variables are included. Table 1 below shows the list of institutional quality variables considered, 
their definitions and the expected nature of relationship (positive/negative) with the illicit flows. The 
above variables are part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset and downloaded from the World 
Bank’s WDI database. 
Table 1: Governance variables, their description and expected nature of relationship 
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Variable Description Expected Sign 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can take 
part in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media 
Negative 
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 




Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies 
Negative 
Regulatory Quality Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that allow and promote private 
sector development 
Negative 
Corruption Captures perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys. Corruption is defined as the misuse of 
public power for private benefit 
Negative 
Rule of Law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society and the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence 
Negative 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc). Transparency 
International. 
Note:  The Worldwide Governance Indicators report on six broad dimensions of governance for over 200 countries and territories 
over the period of 1996 to 2016. Out of six measures, only the “control of corruption” variable is not used. Instead, Corruption 
Perception Index from Transparency International is used as a measure of corruption in this analysis.  
 
The other control variables considered are GDP and proportion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
GDP. Variables used as indicators of economic risk are variance of inflation, variance of interest rate and 
variance of exchange rate. Data for all five variables are downloaded from the WDI database of the World 
Bank for the period of 2005 to 2014. 
Table A.1 in Appendix A provides the list of variables, year range and source information. Tables in 
Appendix B and C show the summary statistics of variables. 
Empirical results 
 
This section presents the econometric results obtained by empirically testing eq. (13) for a balanced panel 
of 47 developing and developed countries. Since the countries in the sample have a diverse 
socioeconomic background, a fixed-effect model is used for all regressions so that country-specific 
characteristics do not affect the results. The Hausman test conducted also confirms the suitability of fixed-
effect method. GDP and IFFs are converted into natural logarithms. 
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Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Table B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B. The correlations 
between the institutional variables, on the one hand, and between the economic risk indicators, on the 
other, are provided in Table B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B. 
Table C.1 reports the results of the fixed-effect panel regressions. Specification (A) reports the results of 
the full model that includes parameters for both institutional quality and economic risk to determine their 
combined significance. Specifications (B) and (F) test the correlations of institutional quality and 
economic risk separately. In specification (C), (D) and (E), the parameters of institutional quality, namely 
Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Political Stability, are tested 
independently to evaluate their direct relation to the IFFs and to test the stability of the model. In 
specification (G) through (K), the parameters of economic risk, variance of inflation, variance of interest 
rate and variance of exchange rate are tested independently for the same reason.  
Associations with macroeconomic variables 
The impact of GDP is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications. All 
specifications consistently report that the stocks of IFFs and FDI share of GDP have a positive 
relationship that is statistically significant at the level of 1 percent. The impact of return differential is not 
found to be statistically significant.  
Of three economic risk parameters, only the variance of exchange rate has a consistent negative sign, as 
expected, in all regressions in which it is included. It is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in full 
model (A) and (B), but loses its significance in the specification (D). Variances of inflation and interest 
rates are not statistically significant.  
Associations with institutional quality variables 
Corruption is included in all specifications involving institution parameters since it is the main variable of 
interest among them. In all specifications where it is tested to be statistically significant at the level of 10 
percent or less, corruption is found to have a correlation on the IFFs. This result is consistent with Le and 
Rishi (2006), which finds that corruption affects capital flight, despite their estimated capital flight using 
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the WBR model, while illicit financial flows data were generated using the Trade Mispricing model and 
Hot Money measure. 
Regulatory quality is also found to have a negative sign, as expected, in all specifications it is included 
[(A), (F) and (G)], however, it is not statistically significant in all of them. Political Stability is also found 
to be consistent, both in terms of sign and magnitude, in all specifications it is included [(A), (F) and (K)]. 
This result is consistent with Le and Zak’s (2006) study, which finds that Political Instability is one of the 
key factors associated with capital flight. The other three variables, Government Effectiveness, 
Accountability and Rule of Law, are neither statistically significant nor are signs as expected. 
In sum, out of six institutional quality parameters, Corruption and Political Stability are found to have 
statistically significant correlation with the IFFs, regardless of how other economic risk and macro 
variables are specified. However, it is important to note that, at best, only 25 percent of sample variation 
is explained by any specification in Table C.1. 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to quantify the direct socio-economic impacts of the IFFs; however, an increasing amount of 
literature has proven empirically that they are negative and have significant consequences. One direct 
impact of the IFFs is that they drain much-needed capital out of the private and public investment 
portfolios in many countries. This runaway capital could have been used to spur growth, build 
infrastructure and develop capacity in areas where it is needed most. One less explored, yet significant, 
impact of the IFFs is their effect on the institutions. Illicit flows are primarily generated by criminal 
activities, such as tax evasion and money laundering, and are often aided by corrupt offices/officials. 
Thus, the illicit flows undermine the credibility, integrity and accountability of state institutions through 
corruption. On the other hand, weak institutions may contribute to the existence of such flows due to poor 
regulatory enforcement.   
This paper derived an econometric model, based on capital flight equations of Le and Zak (2006) and Le 
and Rishi (2006), that explicitly included institutional qualities as direct contributors of the IFFs 
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generation. Unlike in Le and Rishi (2006) which used the World Bank method to estimate the capital 
flight, this paper used estimates of illicit flows produced by GFI using narrower measures. Based on the 
model, an empirical model is proposed and tested. Results strongly suggest that corruption and political 
stability have significant impacts on the IFFs, similar to the findings of Le and Zak (2006) and Le and 
Rishi (2006) . Economic risk factors, however, seems to have limited to no effect on the IFFs. This 
reinforces the inference, made earlier in this paper, that the generating mechanism of the IFFs is primarily 
based on the quality of institutions; the weaker the institution, the more capital that will likely flow out of 
the country illegally, while holding other macro variables constant. 
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Appendix 




Variable Years Covered Source 
Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) (log) 2005 – 2014 Global Financial Integrity (2017) 
Return Differential (Ri – Rf) 2005 – 2014 World Development Indicators (2017) 
Inflation (variance) 2005 – 2014 World Development Indicators (2017) 
Exchange (variance) 2005 – 2014 World Development Indicators (2017) 
Interest rate (variance) 2005 – 2014 World Development Indicators (2017) 
Foreign Direct Investment * 2005 – 2014 World Development Indicators (2017) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP PPP) (log) 2005 – 2014 World Development Indicators (2017) 
Voice and Accountability 2005 – 2014 Worldwide Governance Indicators (2017), downloaded 
from the WDI database 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 2005 – 2014 Worldwide Governance Indicators (2017), downloaded 
from the WDI database. 
Government effectiveness 2005 – 2014 Worldwide Governance Indicators (2017), downloaded 
from the WDI database 
Regulatory quality 2005 – 2014 Worldwide Governance Indicators (2017), downloaded 
from the WDI database 
Rule of law 2005 – 2014 Worldwide Governance Indicators (2017), downloaded 
from the WDI database 









Summary table with results from Student’s t-tests 
Note: 5 t-tests were performed using mean of all years, mean of 2005-2009, mean of 2010-2014, initial (earliest) year and latest year of each country. 











IFFs (millions of US$) - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
GDP PPP (millions of US$) - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
CPI Index ** * ** - ** 
When taken averages over the years, CPI data show 
statistical differences at , at least, 90% confidence 
level. Population of countries included in this study 
show, in general, higher level of corruption 
perception than those who reside in excluded 
countries. 
Government Effectiveness ** ** *** ** *** 
Two groups have statistically significant differences 
in government effectiveness data.  This study found 
no statistically significant linkage between 
government effectiveness and IFF flows.  
Political Stability - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
Regulatory Quality *** *** *** ** *** 
Two groups have statistically significant differences 
in government effectiveness data.  This study found 
no statistically significant linkage between 
regulatory quality and IFF flows.  
Rule of Law - - ** - *** 
Two groups display statistically significant 
differences for last 5 years included in this study. No 
difference exists for the first 5-year period. This 
study found no statistically significant linkage 
between rule of law and IFF flows.  
Voice and Accountability *** *** *** *** *** 
Two groups have statistically significant differences 
in accountability index. This study found no 
statistically significant linkage between 
accountability index and IFF flows.  
FDI (millions of US$) - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
Exchange Rate Variance - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
Inflation Variance - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
Return Differential - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
Interest Rate Variance - - - - - No statistical difference between two groups. 
Note: “-” no statistically significant difference; * statistical difference at p<.01; ** statistical difference at p<.05; *** statistical difference at p<.01 
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Table A.3 






t-statistics P-value Note 
IFFs (millions of US$) 7,221.37 9,214.40 0.4763 0.6356 - 
GDP PPP (millions of US$) 412,558.28 278,634.90 -0.7222 0.4715 - 
CPI Index 7.85 7.11 -1.9445 0.0553 * 
Government Effectiveness 25.32 23.88 -4.2815 0.0000 *** 
Political Stability 35.62 31.12 -2.0094 0.0471 ** 
Regulatory Quality 2.80 2.52 -2.4443 0.0161 ** 
Rule of Law 2.65 2.68 0.2576 0.7971 - 
Voice and Accountability 2.92 2.49 -3.9104 0.0002 *** 
FDI (millions of US$) 2.68 2.50 -1.5454 0.1249 - 
Exchange Rate Variance 2.86 2.51 -2.8046 0.0059 *** 
Inflation Variance 5,420.96 4,175.48 -0.4823 0.6303 - 
Return Differential 21.06 19.78 -3.6866 0.0004 *** 
Interest Rate Variance 0.01 20.25 1.0000 0.3210 - 










t-statistics P-value Note 
IFFs (millions of US$) 6,228.21 5,532.96 -0.2826 0.7781 - 
GDP PPP (millions of US$) 344,253.79 219,595.01 -0.8803 0.3805 - 
CPI Index 33.90 30.02 -1.7701 0.0798 * 
Government Effectiveness 2.77 2.52 -2.3053 0.0230 ** 
Political Stability 2.62 2.69 0.4961 0.6208 - 
Regulatory Quality 2.88 2.50 -3.4422 0.0008 *** 
Rule of Law 2.65 2.51 -1.1621 0.2475 - 
Voice and Accountability 2.86 2.50 -2.7505 0.0069 *** 
FDI (millions of US$) 4,373.57 3,659.70 -0.3956 0.6930 - 
Exchange Rate Variance 0.01 1338888892.60 1.0000 0.3207 - 
Inflation Variance 17.70 32.01 1.5346 0.1273 - 
Return Differential 50.22 49.56 -0.5682 0.5715 - 
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Interest Rate Variance 89.05 125.26 1.1909 0.2363 - 
Note: “-” no statistically significant difference; * statistical difference at p<.01; ** statistical difference at p<.05; *** statistical difference at p<.01 
 
Table A.5 
Results of Student’s t-test using mean of 2010-2014  




t-statistics P-value Note 
IFFs (millions of US$) 8,375.38 9,317.78 0.2167 0.8290 - 
GDP PPP (millions of US$) 496,102.93 350,248.83 -0.6153 0.5394 - 
CPI Index 38.01 33.38 -2.0285 0.0449 ** 
Government Effectiveness 2.83 2.52 -2.6550 0.0091 *** 
Political Stability 2.68 2.67 -0.0752 0.9402 - 
Regulatory Quality 2.97 2.48 -4.3536 0.0000 *** 
Rule of Law 2.71 2.49 -2.0185 0.0459 ** 
Voice and Accountability 2.87 2.51 -2.8531 0.0051 *** 
FDI (millions of US$) 6,638.45 4,766.56 -0.5391 0.5907 - 
Exchange Rate Variance 0.01 48.45 1.0001 0.3208 - 
Inflation Variance 13.33 11.38 -0.1887 0.8511 - 
Return Differential 51.63 51.46 -0.1544 0.8776 - 
Interest Rate Variance 89.05 125.26 1.1909 0.2363 - 
Note: “-” no statistically significant difference; * statistical difference at p<.01; ** statistical difference at p<.05; *** statistical difference at p<.01 
 
Table A.6 
Results of Student’s t-test using first available (earliest) year 




t-statistics P-value Note 
IFFs (millions of US$) 4,728.32 2,970.94 -1.1539 0.2509 - 
GDP PPP (millions of US$) 289,361.57 172,914.00 -1.0365 0.3023 - 
CPI Index 33.02 30.32 -1.2490 0.2147 - 
Government Effectiveness 2.74 2.51 -2.0125 0.0466 ** 
Political Stability 2.59 2.70 0.7565 0.4510 - 
Regulatory Quality 2.81 2.51 -2.5626 0.0116 ** 
Rule of Law 2.63 2.52 -0.8984 0.3709 - 
Voice and Accountability 2.84 2.49 -2.7414 0.0071 *** 
FDI (millions of US$) 3,031.59 2,180.82 -0.6691 0.5045 - 
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Exchange Rate Variance 0.01 0.06 0.9672 0.3366 - 
Inflation Variance 28.82 17.30 -0.4762 0.6360 - 
Return Differential 49.75 50.43 0.2136 0.8313 - 
Interest Rate Variance 89.05 125.26 1.1909 0.2363 - 
Note: “-” no statistically significant difference; * statistical difference at p<.01; ** statistical difference at p<.05; *** statistical difference at p<.01 
 
Table A.7 
Results of Student’s t-test using last available (latest) year 




t-statistics P-value Note 
IFFs (millions of US$) 8,283.18 8,061.44 -0.0538 0.9572 - 
GDP PPP (millions of US$) 542,233.00 385,745.00 -0.5882 0.5574 - 
CPI Index 39.81 34.32 -2.3768 0.0191 ** 
Government Effectiveness 2.84 2.50 -2.9288 0.0041 *** 
Political Stability 2.69 2.68 -0.0595 0.9527 - 
Regulatory Quality 2.98 2.47 -4.4820 0.0000 *** 
Rule of Law 2.78 2.49 -2.7752 0.0065 *** 
Voice and Accountability 2.90 2.55 -2.7345 0.0072 *** 
FDI (millions of US$) 6,745.29 4,491.93 -0.6404 0.5229 - 
Exchange Rate Variance 0.00 0.01 1.0223 0.3096 - 
Inflation Variance 3.13 11.39 1.5877 0.1154 - 
Return Differential 52.07 53.27 0.9868 0.3259 - 
Interest Rate Variance 89.05 125.26 1.1909 0.2363 - 
Note: “-” no statistically significant difference; * statistical difference at p<.01; ** statistical difference at p<.05; *** statistical difference at p<.01 
 
Table A.8 
List of countries included in this study and their regional affiliations 




















Algeria Northern Africa 8483.9 453100.0 31.3 2.5 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.1 
Armenia Asia 1004.7 19824.3 30.3 2.9 3.0 3.3 2.6 2.3 
Azerbaijan Asia 10649.0 127056.7 24.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.2 1.7 
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Bangladesh Asia 7514.9 362800.0 23.1 2.2 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.6 
Belarus Europe 8985.9 143648.6 25.2 2.0 3.2 1.7 2.0 1.4 
Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa 1369.0 26975.3 59.4 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.6 3.5 
Brazil Latin America and the Caribbean 21523.1 2717000.0 38.0 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.5 
Bulgaria Europe 2480.8 106649.9 38.9 3.1 3.3 3.6 2.9 3.5 
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa 785.9 21372.0 34.2 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.7 
Chile Latin America and the Caribbean 6017.1 312500.0 71.2 4.2 3.5 4.5 4.3 4.1 
Colombia Latin America and the Caribbean 5004.2 493300.0 37.1 2.9 1.4 3.3 2.6 2.8 
Costa Rica Latin America and the Caribbean 12419.2 57388.4 49.9 3.3 3.6 3.5 3.5 4.0 
Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa 2193.1 54300.5 23.4 1.9 1.5 2.2 1.8 1.9 
Croatia Europe 3561.8 84957.6 41.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.5 
Dominican Republic Latin America and the Caribbean 1683.1 104760.8 29.7 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.4 3.1 
Georgia Asia 1526.7 26313.4 39.7 3.3 2.3 3.4 2.8 2.9 
Guatemala Latin America and the Caribbean 2166.9 96108.1 29.7 2.3 2.2 2.8 1.9 2.7 
Guyana Latin America and the Caribbean 322.8 4273.8 26.5 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 3.0 
Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean 180.5 15423.1 18.1 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.6 2.2 
Honduras Latin America and the Caribbean 4765.9 31946.0 26.0 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.0 2.6 
India Asia 18365.5 5147000.0 33.9 2.9 1.8 2.6 3.0 3.4 
Indonesia Asia 17377.4 1987000.0 27.9 2.8 2.1 2.7 2.4 3.0 
Jamaica Latin America and the Caribbean 643.7 22629.9 34.7 3.2 2.8 3.3 2.6 3.5 
Jordan Asia 1630.3 64065.9 49.2 3.1 2.6 3.2 3.4 2.3 
Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa 190.9 4696.5 37.7 2.6 3.1 2.4 2.7 3.0 
Malaysia Asia 41797.0 585000.0 48.6 4.1 3.1 3.6 3.5 2.6 
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa 538.8 26531.2 29.2 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.0 
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa 616.7 19092.8 51.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 
Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean 57030.5 1742000.0 33.6 3.2 2.3 3.4 2.5 3.1 
Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa 1130.9 18115.8 45.2 3.1 3.9 3.1 3.2 3.4 
Nicaragua Latin America and the Caribbean 2989.4 23428.3 26.3 2.1 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.6 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa 18396.1 771800.0 24.3 2.0 1.0 2.2 1.8 2.2 
Paraguay Latin America and the Caribbean 3699.7 43422.0 23.3 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.8 
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Peru Latin America and the Caribbean 4267.6 281600.0 35.9 2.7 2.1 3.4 2.3 3.1 
Philippines Asia 8873.2 512200.0 28.0 3.0 1.6 2.9 2.5 3.0 
Republic of Moldova Europe 919.5 13814.4 31.5 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.8 
Romania Europe 2772.9 330200.0 37.7 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.4 
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa 259.2 13412.5 39.2 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.6 1.8 
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa 856.4 27166.7 34.3 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.9 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 15255.9 597900.0 45.3 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.1 3.6 
Sri Lanka Asia 1660.6 169200.0 33.8 2.9 1.9 2.8 3.0 2.5 
Thailand Asia 14496.0 872500.0 35.5 3.3 1.8 3.2 2.9 2.5 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Europe 480.3 22332.2 37.3 2.9 2.5 3.2 2.7 3.1 
Ukraine Europe 11542.5 361600.0 25.2 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.9 
Uruguay Latin America and the Caribbean 1219.4 54617.4 68.3 3.5 3.8 3.4 3.6 4.1 
Viet Nam Asia 8891.7 376600.0 28.1 2.8 3.2 2.4 2.6 1.6 
















Appendix B: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Table B.1 
Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic variables 
      
 No. of Obs. Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Illicit Financial Flows (log) 470 7.852 1.598 0.828 11.278 
Rt - Rf 470 102.605 8.272 53.960 145.536 
GDP (log) 470 25.323 1.702 21.866 29.626 
Interest rate (variance) 470 32.651 151.257 0.000 2,180.000 
Exchange rate (variance) 470 0.006 0.019 0.000 0.205 
Inflation (variance) 470 14.748 81.957 0.000 1,117.258 








Descriptive statistics of institutional quality variables 
      
 No. of Obs. Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Corruption 470 35.623 11.860 14.000 73.000 
Government Effectiveness 470 2.796 0.591 0.969 4.286 
Political Stability 470 2.645 0.756 0.702 4.183 
Regulatory Quality 470 2.924 0.562 1.360 4.547 
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Rule of Law 470 2.676 0.575 1.316 4.419 
Accountability 470 2.864 0.640 1.230 4.244 
 
Table B.3 
Correlation among main macroeconomic variables 
       
 Rt - Rf GDP (log) Interest rate (variance) Exchange rate (variance) Inflation (variance) FDI/GDP 
Rt - Rf 1.00000 0.01778 -0.14378 -0.03288 -0.08039 -0.00214 
GDP (log) 0.01778 1.00000 0.03839 0.03589 -0.00769 -0.20399 
Interest rate (variance) -0.14378 0.03839 1.00000 0.21656 0.25170 -0.02773 
Exchange rate (variance) -0.03288 0.03589 0.21656 1.00000 0.76000 -0.04424 
Inflation (variance) -0.08039 -0.00769 0.25170 0.76000 1.00000 -0.01668 








Correlation among institutional quality variables 
       
 Corruption Gov. Effectiveness Political Stability Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Accountability 
Corruption 1.000000 0.799161 0.583054 0.765443 0.880725 0.610195 
Gov. Effectiveness 0.799161 1.000000 0.475131 0.837702 0.874571 0.590829 
Political Stability 0.583054 0.475131 1.000000 0.467728 0.620620 0.454734 
Regulatory Quality 0.765443 0.837702 0.467728 1.000000 0.785170 0.682964 
Rule of Law 0.880725 0.874571 0.620620 0.785170 1.000000 0.642663 
Accountability 0.610195 0.590829 0.454734 0.682964 0.642663 1.000000 
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Appendix C: Regression results. Table C.1: Panel regression analysis of macroeconomic and non-macroeconomic variables and illicit 
financial flows from 2005 to 2014 for 47 countries  
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